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DAVID S. MASON

The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982

Over the last three years, the Polish United Workers' Party has suffered a major
crisis, the most substantial crisis of any Communist party in any Communist
party state. The disintegration of the party was at least partly responsible for
both the development of Solidarity in the summer of 1980 and the imposition of
martial law in December 1981. The lack of trust in the party and its authoritarian
and unrepresentative character led the workers to demand an institution more
responsive to their own needs. But the growth of Solidarity during 1981 and the
continuing disintegration and fragmentation of the party led the military to
preempt the leading role of the party in 1982.
The collapse of the party in 1980 and 1981 was due to a number of factors.!
The party leadership had to bear the burden of the economi<; failures of the late
1970s and the consequent decline in the standard of living. The party itself had
grown rapidly in size during that period, even though the influence of ordinary
party members and local party organizations declined in the face of increasing
tendencies toward centralization in the second half of the decade. This development led to problems of morale even within the party and to the growth of
horizontal barriers between the membership and its leaders. The population at
large was increasingly annoyed and disgusted with the failure of the party to
improve the economic situation and to allow a more honest and open discussion
of Poland's problems. The dissatisfaction was compounded by the widespread
perception that the elite was increasingly looking after its own interests only and
that benefits and privileges were accruing only to those in power.
By the spring of 1981, however, the "renewal" movement that was sweeping
the country had begun to penetrate the party, leading it to embark on housecleaning and reforms of its own. Much of this initiative came from the rank and
file of the party, while there was some resistance on the part of the leadership.
The changes that did occur were extensive enough to worry the Soviet party
leadership, which issued a number of warnings to its Polish counterpart. As the
party became less hierarchical and less disciplined, as party members continued
to join Solidarity, and as Solidarity continued to mount its challenge to the
centralized Polish political system, the regime apparently feared a total collapse
of the party-a collapse creating a vacuum that only Solidarity or the army could
fill.
In this paper I shall examine membership and policies of the party during
1980-1982, the attitudes of the public toward the party and its role in society,
and the opinions of party members themselves. Survey research conducted by
Polish institutions during this period, or conducted earlier and distributed during

The author thanks the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for supporting
research in Poland in 1982 that contributed to this article. This study is part of a larger work in
progress, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982.
1. For an excellent treatment of party developments leading up to 1980, see Jack BieIasiak,
"The Party: Permanent Crisis," in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Poland: Genesis of a Revolution (New
York: Vintage, 1983), pp. 10-25.
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1980-1982, furnishes much of the data on which this study is based. Some of
the material is remarkably candid and provides an unusually detailed picture of
the membership, attitudes, and role of a ruling Communist party.
A major and long-term problem for the Polish United Workers' Party, as for
all ruling Communist parties, is that of maintaining the elite and leading role of
the party while simultaneously keeping the party reasonably representative of
the population. 2 For the Polish party, it has been particularly difficult to limit
the proportion of white-collar workers, who have dominated both membership
rolls and leadership positions. In 1974, for example, "mental workers" made up
42 percent of the party membership but only 22 percent of the work force. While
49 percent of all engineers, 45 percent of technicians, and 70 percent of teachers
were party members or candidate members, only about 18 percent of blue-collar
workers were members of the workers' party. Furthermore, representation of
blue-collar workers in other institutions, including workers' councils, was also
weak. A Polish sociologist noted in 1975:
The deg~ee of organization and social activization of workers is quite low,
relative both to the postulated model of the working class in socialist society
and to the size and economic role of that class. 3
The problem posed by the lack of institutionalized mechanisms for the
expression of workers' grievances was once again dramatized in the riots of the
summer of 1976. One of the responses of the regime to these events was a
sustained campaign to increase the number of workers and young people in the
party. Party membership rolls expanded at an unprecedented rate in the late
1970s. 4 By the end of 1979, members and candidates of the party constituted
almost 12 percent of the adult population and over 20 percent of those employed
in the socialized sector of the economy. These percentages were the highest in
the history of the party. The large membership tended to jeopardize the party's
elite image and "leading role," but the expansion had increased the representation of young people, women, and blue-collar workers in the ranks of the party,
making it as representative in these categories as it had ever been. Blue-collar
workers, for example, constituted 46.2 percent of the party in 1979, compared
to 41.8 percent in 1975. 5
Despite these improvements, the party was still highly unrepresentative of
the population in several respects. While more blue-collar workers had joined
the party, this group was still not well represented in leadership positions. Even
though blue-collar workers constituted almost half of the party membership, they
held only 10 percent of the central party leadership positions, and only 3 percent
of the discussants at Central Committee plenary sessions came from their ranks. 6
2. Darrell Hammer, "The Dilemma of Party Growth," Problems of Communism, 20, no. 4
(July-August 1971):16-21.
3. Jerzy Drllzkiewicz, "Udzial klasy robotniczej w aktywnosci spolecznej," in Jan Malanowski, ed., Nier6wnosci spoleczne w Polsce w swietle badan empirycznych (Warsaw, 1975), p. 21.
4. David S. Mason, "Membership of the Polish United Workers' Party," The Polish Review, 27,
nos. 3-4 (1982): 138-53.
5. Zycie Partii, February 1980.
6. George Kolankiewicz, "The Politics of 'Socialist Renewal,'" in Jean Woodall, ed., Policy and
Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure, Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 59.
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Peasants made up about one-third of the work force but less than 10 percent of
the party membership. This fact was of less interest to urban residents than the
perception-largely based on fact-that the party was dominated by highly educated white-collar workers with high incomes. Official party statistics showed
that 12 percent of party members had a higher education, compared to just
7 percent of the work force. But a sample of working males in the city of L6di
showed that 30 percent of party members had a higher education compared to
11 percent of nonmembers. In fact, over half of those with a complete higher
education were party members. 7 While the party considered it important to attract the "best" people to the organization, including the best educated, the less
well-educated blue-collar workers were irritated by this kind of differentiation.
The expansion and diversification of the party did not solve the problems of
credibility and representation for the regime. If anything, the image of the party
as being made up of "opportunists" was reinforced in the late 1970s. Furthermore, the failure of the regime to allow decentralization of power and decision
making even within the party was an obstacle to people's confidence in the party
and detrimental to morale within the organization. Public assessment of the party
remained highly negative.
The party had never been very popular in Poland, but the lack of confidence
in the organization was not publicly affirmed until spring 1981, when the press
briefly referred to an official public opinion poll on confidence in institutions. 8
Of fifteen institutions, including the government, the militia, and the old trade
unions, the Polish United Workers' Party ranked last. While this poll showed
32 percent of the population expressing confidence in the party, a similar survey
conducted by Solidarity among its own members in November 1981 also showed
the party in last place, with a confidence rating of 7 percent. 9 This very low level
of support for the "leading" organization was derived from a number of complaints Poles had about the party and about those in power. They included the
widespread feeling that those in policy making and managerial positions were
incompetent, that they abused their power by attaching extravagant privileges
to their positions, that the party and the elite closed off access to decision making
for people who were not members of the party and ruled by compulsion rather
than consensus, and that the party had forsaken its own stated ideals of socialism
and egalitarianism. These were wide-ranging issues that called into question the
role of the party in Polish society.
The sense that the party and its leadership were incompetent was not always
as strong as it had become by 1980. During the first half of the 1970s, for
example, there were some positive evaluations of the Gierek leadership. An
7. From a survey of 1000 adult males in the city of L6di in the fall of 1980, conducted by.the
Institute of Sociology of the University of Warsaw and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of
the Polish Academy of Sciences (hereafter L6di 1980).
8. The survey, "Spoleczne zaufanie do instytucji politycznych, spolecznych i administracyjnych,"
was conducted in May 1981 by the Center for Public Research of Polish Radio and Television
(Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej).
9. Solidarity's poll, among its own members, was conducted by the Center for Social Research
(6srodek BadaD. Spolecznych) of Solidarity's Mazowsze region: "Czlonkowie ZwillZku 0 bl~dach
krajowych wladz ZwillZku" (Warsaw: November 1981). For results of these two polls, see David S.
Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public," Soviet Studies, 35, no. 4 (October 1983): 538.

The Polish Party in Crisis

33

official poll from 1975 showed that almost 85 percent of the people believed that
"in the last several years society had confidence in the leadership of the country."l0 Over 90 percent of this sample believed the developments in the country
since 1970 had been "quick," and the most frequently mentioned reason for
these developments was "the new leadership of the party and the country." Even
taking into consideration the official nature of this poll and the atmosphere in
which it was conducted, the results are markedly different from answers to similar
questions in 1981, which showed 30 percent or fewer expressing trust in the
government and the party.u This decline in confidence in the late 1970s was due
in large part to the decline in the economy and the standard of living during that
period and to the simultaneous burgeoning of Poland's foreign debt. Many Poles
wondered where the money had gone and assumed that it had been either wasted
or appropriated by the elite, an assumption that contributed to the widespread
belief that the economic and political leadership was incompetent. A poll conducted among a small (330) sample of men in Warsaw in the summer of 1979,
for example, showed that only 20 percent thought "ability" played a decisive
role in helping people reach high positions in Polish society. As the researchers
pointed out, a similar question asked in the United States showed 70 percent
assigning a decisive role to ability.12
The popular perception of incompetence in the leadership of the party and
the country was aggravated by the widespread belief that the elite was unjustly
benefiting from its positions of power. The issue of privilege has always been a
sensitive one in Poland, a society that values highly the principle of egalitarianism. Unequal distribution of wealth and power is seen as contradictory to the
basic principles of socialist society. This issue has always been discussed in Poland, though largely in private. In the period between 1979 and 1981, however,
it was treated more directly and openly in both the official and the unofficial
press. The result was an increase in popular frustration.
In the unofficial "Report on the State of the Republic" by the "Experience
and the Future" study group, the issues which most clearly stood out in their
description of society were "the social structure, its hierarchical character, antiegalitarian tendencies, and the emergence of a system of privileges that conflicts
with the sense of social justice so deeply rooted, thanks to socialist ideology, in
our society."13 There was a widespread perception in Polish society at the end of
the 1970s that social inequalities had increased over the past decade. But as one
analyst of official public opinion data pointed out, "the present egalitarianism"
was directed not so much against differences in earnings as "mainly against the
economic position and life style of the leadership apparatus." Most people, he
pointed out, believe
it is unfair that high positions are linked with privileges and they demand
that incomes be reduced, and that the availability of goods in short supply,
10. Zbigniew Sufin, ed., Spoleczenstwo polskie w drugiej polowie lat siedemdziesiqtych: raporty
z badan (Warsaw: Instytut Podstawowych Problem6w Marksizmu-Leninizmu, 1981), p. 21.
11. Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public."
12. Magdalena Gadomska, "Swiadomosc nier6wnosci," Przeglqd Techniczny, May 24, 1981,
pp. 19-21.
13. Poland Today: The State of the Republic, compo by the "Experience and the Future Discussion Group" (White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1981), p. 57.
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such as housing and automobiles, access to special shops, private clubs,
clinics, and so forth, for persons in high positions be restricted. 14

All of these issues and complaints were to become strong elements in the
appeal of Solidarity and its program. The preliminary program for Solidarity,
drawn up by a group of advisers for the organization in the spring of 1981,
demanded that restrictions be placed on the privileges of the elite and that the
costs of economic recovery and reform be borne "particularly by people enjoying
privileges linked with the exercise of power." 15 The restrictions on privileges were
especially directed at those in "the power apparatus" and included limitations
on apartments, office automobiles, and special health services and required disclosure of incomes and property.
It should be emphasized here that the concern over privilege was not directed
at the party membership at large but rather at those in positions of power.
Considerable concern with elite privilege existed even within the party. A party
report on letters addressed to the Central Committee by rank-and-file party
members mentioned numerous letters advocating "the liquidation of commercial
stores and other special stores" and "stores in the militia, the army and the
committees of the PUWP."16 The reference to the committees of the party suggests that there was concern with privilege not just in the central bureaucracy
but at lower levels as well. Here, as elsewhere, we see that Polish society in
1980-1981 was divided not so much between party members and nonmembers
but rather between those in positions of power (at all levels) and the rest of the
people, whether party members or not.
While the issues of competence and privilege were sensitive and inflammatory ones, questions about the role of the PUWP in Polish society were potentially much more dangerous and destabilizing. The issues raised in this context
included overcentralization of power and lack of democracy within the party and
the excessive control and dominance of the party in societal decision making.
These kinds of criticism were voiced both by the public and by rank-and-file
party members during 1980 and 1981. Kurczewski's analysis of an official poll
by the Center for Public Opinion Research of Polish Radio and Television in
1980 concluded that the leadership should be rotated and "the principles of
selection and promotion be democratized" within the partyY The "Experience
and the Future" group also argued in favor of limiting the terms of office of the
top leadership levels of the party. 18
Perhaps the most systematic criticism of party organization and leadership
came from within the party. The suggestion most frequently made in letters to
the Central Committee was that the terms of office for party leaders should be
limited. But the writers also called for more information within the party, secret
elections, changes in party nominating procedures, and open sessions of the
14. Jacek Kurczewski, "w oczach opinii pubJicznej," Kultura (Warsaw), March 21, 1981, p. 9.
15. "The Directions of the Operations of Solidarity in the Current Situation of the Country,"
Glos Pracy, April 14, 1981; translated in Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report no. 210
(July 22, 1981).
16. Zbigniew Sufin, ed., Diagnozy spoleczne W okresie narastajqcego kryzysu (Warsaw: Instytut
Podstawowych Problem6w Marksizmu-Leninizmu, 1981), p. 221.
17. Kurczewski, "W oczach."
18. Poland Today, p. 173.
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Central Committee and lower level committees. 19 These criticisms were accompanied by complaints about the increasing centralization of power in the hands
of members of the central party apparatus. Centralization took two forms: the
arrogation of decision making authority by the party from the state and other
institutions, and the concentration of power within the party from the periphery
to the center. A Polish sociologist pointed out that this "absurd" process of
centralization had reduced the significance of local party committees "almost to
zero" in the late 1970s. 20 Solidarity asserted in its program that the method of
governing based on the domination of .the central party-state institutions "had
led the country to ruin."21
Many of these issues were summed up in a set of recommendations issued
to the Central Committee of the party by a group of experts attached to the
party's Institute of the Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism. The report, delivered in October 1980, defined the main characteristic of the crisis as a lack of
confidence in the governing of society and suggested a number of changes, including decentralization of state and party authority, greater intra-party democracy and egalitarianism, the widening of "social participation" in decision making
and increased autonomy for other institutions, and an improvement of the electoral procedures of the party, including the nomination of two candidates for
each leadership position. 22 As will be seen below, many of these changes were
made during 1981.
These criticisms and recommendations reflected a deeper sense that the
population had little opportunity to voice its opinions or participate in decision
making. The popular feeling of alienation from politics had increased dramatically during the late 1970s. In 1976 only 41 percent of a sample of males in the
city of L6di cited the degree of "participation in governing" as a source of
tension and conflict in society. By 1980, 80 percent cited this factor.23 Solidarity's
preliminary program hammered at the idea that the loss of democratic institutions was the root cause of the crisis: "The bureaucratic system of governing the
state and managing the economy has helped establish a closed group of rulers
who are not subject to control by the governed."24
The popular frustration with the role of the party and the centralization of
power was especially apparent in two national surveys conducted by the Academy
of Sciences at the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, entitled Polacy '80 and Polacy
'81.25 In the Polacy '80 survey, over 92 percent agreed with the proposition that
there should be "increased control of society over the authorities." That this was
not to be accomplished through the party was evident from the response to
another question about "strengthening the role of the party in the administration
19. Sufin, Diagnozy, pp. 209-30.
20. Jacek Tarkowski, "Wladze terenowe po reformie," in Jerzy Wiatr, ed., Wladza lokalna u
progu kryzysu (Warsaw: 1983), pp. 23-76.
21. "Program NSZZ Solidarnosc," Tygodnik Solidarnosc, October 16, 1981.
22. Sufin, Diagnozy.
23. L6di 1980, and similar survey conducted in the same city in 1976 (hereafter L6di 1976).
See n. 7.
24. "Directions of the Operations of Solidarity."
25. Polacy '80 was a national representative sample of about 2500 Poles, conducted in November
and December of 1980 and reported in Polacy '80: wyniki badan ankietowych (Warsaw: Polska
Akademia Nauk, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii, 1981). Polacy '81 was a similar survey conducted at
the end of 1981 and reported in an in-house publication: Polacy '81 (Warsaw: IFIS PAN).
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of power." In 1980 only 33 percent agreed with this proposition and 56 percent
disagreed; by the end of 1981 only 20 percent favored strengthening the party.
When the question was reversed in 1981-whether the role of the party should
be limited-60 percent favored the idea, while only 20 percent opposed it. Even
46 percent of party members favored limiting the role of the party. 26
In trying to determine the types of authority relationships desired by the
population, the researchers for Polacy '81 asked if the respondents favored a
centralized or a decentralized system, with or without the party playing a leading
role. Although there was a considerable division on both issues, by far the largest
proportion of respondents favored a decentralized system without a leading role
for the party and "based on the participation of various social forces," as the
statement was phrased. There was stronger support for a decentralized system
(44.4 percent) than for a centralized one (32.8 percent). But the really astounding result of this question concerned the leading role of the party. Only 24.5
percent favored such a role, while a clear majority (52.7 percent) opted for a
system without a leading role for the party.27 This result testifies to the thorough
disillusionment of Polish society with the PUWP. In Poland, as in all Communist
states, the leading role of the party has been the sine qua non of the political
system. This principle is incorporated in the Polish Constitution and even in the
Gdansk Agreements of 1980. It was the basis on which the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yet by the end of 1981
the Polish party was so discredited that the majority of Poles was apparently
willing to revise that fundamental component of the political system.
Frustration with the PUWP did not, however, translate into a wish to constitute any new political parties. In the Polacy '81 survey only 25 percent favored
constituting some "new political parties besides the PUWP, the Social Democratic Party and the United Peasant Party" (these are the two satellite parties of
the PUWP, which are allied with the PUWP in the Front of National Unity and
which have some seats in the Polish parliament but exert little independent political influence). Opposition to the creation of a new political party was fairly
uniform across the political spectrum. Seventy-seven percent of party members
were opposed to the idea (although 24 percent favored it!), as were 69 percent
of Solidarity members. There was also little support for the proposition that
Solidarity should create a political party to operate alongside the union. Only
20 percent of the overall sample and 23 percent of Solidarity members favored
this idea.
The population thus did not favor the elimination of the PUWP, or even its
replacement by other parties. It wanted a more pluralistic society, in which "society exercises more control over the authorities" and in which there is more
room for political participation and political maneuver by other groups, including
the existing noncommunist parties and the trade unions. As Solidarity's program
put it: "The state must serve man, and not rule over him; the state organization
must serve society and should not be identified with a single political party."28
Poles opposed the monopolistic control of power by the party, not the party
itself.
26. Polacy'8I.
27. Ibid.
28. "Program NSZZ Solidarnosc."

The Polish Party in Crisis

37

These increasingly vigorous and open challenges to the party could not help
but affect the members of that besieged organization. Between August 1980 and
December 1981, there were unprecedented changes in party membership and
party leadership. Between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, over 400,000
members left the party. This was by far the largest number of defections in one
year in the history of the party, and, with 13 percent of the total party membership, the largest percentage decline except for the year 1958. In February 1982
the official press admitted that the party had lost almost a half million members
since July 1981. It is evident that most of those who left were blue-collar workers,
since the working-class component of the party had declined from 46.2 percent
at the end of 1979 to 42.7 percent in early 1982.29
Many of those who left the party joined Solidarity, but there were probably
even more party members who stayed in the party and joined Solidarity. Estimates of the number of party members in Solidarity range up to 1.7 million of
the party's three million members.30 This figure is probably too high. In two
separate survey research polls at the end of 1980, 35 percent of party members
admitted to membership in Solidarity.31 This is a remarkably high percentage in
itself, however, and is close to the percentage of the general population in Solidarity (37 percent). An even greater number of party members supported Solidarity, even if they did not join the organization. In the Polacy '80 survey,
45 percent of party members expressed "decisive support" for the activities of
Solidarity. Dual membership in Solidarity and the party was especially prevalent
among skilled blue- and white-collar workers, as is apparent from table 1.
As the table shows, three quarters of all skilled workers, party members
and nonmembers alike, belonged to Solidarity at the end of 1981. There were
also extremely high rates of Solidarity membership among specialists and the
"leadership cadre," including most party members in these categories.
There are several possible explanations of why so many party members,
particularly those in prestige and leadership positions, joined Solidarity. First of
all, the appeal of Solidarity was so widespread that it cut across the lines of the
"establishment" to include many supporters of the regime. Most rank-and-file
Table 1. Party Members in Solidarity, by Occupational Groups (percentage)

Occupational Groups
Specialists with higher
education and leadership cadre
Middle cadre and specialists
Office workers and administration
Skilled workers
Farmers and farm workers
Source: Polacy '81.
29. Rzeczpospolita, February 9, 1982.
30. Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 1981.
31. Polacy '80 and L6di 1980.

Percent in Solidarity among:
Party Members
Nonmembers
55.0
64.7
33.3
76.0
15.8

69.5
71.8
61.2
77.6
20.0
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party members supported the existence and goals of Solidarity and may have
seen in it a potential means to loosen the hierarchical controls within the party.
As Solidarity adviser Jadwiga Staniszkis has pointed out, the antihierarchical,
antiinstitutional and egalitarian attitudes of Solidarity found support in the party
as well and fostered genuine common interests between the "renewal" movement
in the party and the membership of Solidarity. 32
Second, it might be expected that party members would be attracted to
Solidarity simply because of their political activism. Party members are joiners
and activists and are more likely to have definite opinions on public issues.
Solidarity provided a new channel for their activities, and a more productive
one. That PUWP members played an active and leading role in Solidarity is
evident from data on party membership among the factory commissions of Solidarity. In five of the six regions (wojewodstwos) for which membership was
reported, party members constituted at least 20 percent of the Solidarity factory
commissions. 33 This overlapping membership of Solidarity and the party extended to the very top of the political system: at the Ninth Congress of the party
in July 1981, 20 percent of the delegates were also Solidarity members.
The changes in the party also affected the professional apparatus. In the
eighteen months after August 1980, 53 percent of party workers, the professional
staff of the organization, left the party "for various reasons." In the preliminary
elections leading up to the Ninth Congress, there was "an almost complete turnover in the leadership cadre of the party." Eighty percent of the regional party
committees were new, as were 65 percent of the village, town, and factory committees and 50 percent of the first secretaries of the primary party organizations. 34 Many of these newly elected local leaders were young people, often with
short party meIllbership records.
The turnover in the professional ranks was bound to affect the leadership
as well. When the party congress elected a new Central Committee in July,
91 percent of the winners were new to the position. Of the fifteen Politburo
members elected at the congress, only four were holdovers. This was the most
rapid and thorough change in the party leadership of any Communist party state.
It reflected fundamental changes and strains within the organization and had
both positive and negative consequences. The "renewal" and rejuvenation of
the party raised the possibility of changes in policy as well, and perhaps of a
more accommodating stance toward Solidarity. But it also caused concern and
fear in the Soviet Union that the Polish party might be losing its "leading role."
The PUWP made substantial efforts to clean house during 1981 and to join
the "renewal" that was occurring throughout Polish society. These efforts included crackdowns on corruption and illegality within the party, restrictions on
privileges, provisions for more openness within the organization, and reforms in
party election rules. The desire for renewal was not unanimous, however. The
32. Jadwiga Staniszkis, "The Evolution of Forms of Working-Class Protest in Poland," Soviet
Studies, 33, no. 2 (April 1981): 229.
33. "'Informator Biuletynu MKZ. NSZZ Solidarnosc" (East-Central Regional Organization of
Solidarity, Lublin), January 30, 1981.
34. Rzeczpospolita, February 25, 1982.
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changes elicited widespread and lively debate within the party and led to deep
divisions between "liberals" and conservatives. 35
The concern about corruption within the party, and particularly the fact that
the population perceived the party as being corrupt, led the Central Committee
to adopt a resolution in March which instructed "central and local party auditing
commissions to accelerate work on the definition of political responsibility of
party members guilty of violations of law and of moral principles" and called on
state and judicial organs to do likewise. 36 The party also proceeded to conduct
"individual talks" with members and to dismiss many from the rolls. Compared
to the mass defections from party ranks during 1981, however, the number of
those purged was relatively small.
There were also efforts to defuse accusations that party officials received
extraordinarily high pay and fringe benefits. A remarkable article that appeared
in the party monthly, entitled "On the budget, wages and property of the party,"
contended that party salaries were lower than those for equivalent positions in
the state administration and economy and that "party workers may not have any
other sources of income, and do not receive any bonuses or periodic awards."37
In an attempt to alleviate concerns about the salaries of party officials the article
listed the wages for members of the Politburo and for secretaries of the Central
Committee (25,930 zlotys) and for other party professionals down to the district
level. The Politburo salary figure, if it can be believed, is 3.5 times the average
national wage, which is within the maximum wage differential that most Poles
consider acceptable.
The party leadership also tried to encourage freer discussion within the
party, although within strictly defined limits. At the plenum of March 1981, for
example, a Central Committee resolution approved of the "lively and often
controversial discussion" taking place within the party, adding, however, that
discussion should remain within the framework of democratic centralism, and
should not degenerate into "ideological pluralism." At the same plenum criticism
of the rigidity and lack of responsiveness to initiatives "from below" on the part
of the leadership was voiced frequently and openly.38 By the summer of 1981, at
the June plenum of the Central Committee, the "renewal" movement had become so pervasive that First Secretary Kania virtually begged the party to retain
the leadership. Party leaders, he said, "would be interested" in ensuring that the
present members of the Politburo and the Central Committee secretaries take
part in the forthcoming congress as delegatesP9 The possibility that they might
not was an indication of the reluctance of many local party organizations to grant
central party officials safe constituencies for the congress elections. It illustrates
once again the increasingly wide gulf between the grass roots and the leadership
of the PUWP. Kania's concern was due in part to the extensive changes in party
leadership at all levels that resulted from the new election rules passed by the
Central Committee in April. Delegates to the congress were to be elected at
35. For a thorough discussion of internal party debates on the renewal, see George Sanford,
Polish Communism in Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
36. Radio Free Europe Research Reports, April 13, 1981.
37. Zycie Partii, April 1981.
38. Radio Free Europe Research Reports, April 13, 1981.
39. Ibid., June 19, 1981.
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provincial, plant, university, and military party conferences. Nominations would
be made by special electoral commissions. But a crucial difference in the new
rules was that there could be an unlimited number of nominations from the floor
of the conferences and that the voting would be by secret ballot. In the past, the
maximum number of nominations permitted from the floor was 15 percent of the
available seats. The "provisional" electoral rules adopted in December 1980 had
allowed for 50 percent, but in response to widespread criticism the limitation
was dropped altogether. Furthermore, the provision for unlimited nominations
had already been adopted by some regional and local party organizations.
Another major accommodation the party had made was in its attitude toward
religious believers within party ranks. Officially the "scientific" and atheistic
worldview of a Marxist-Leninist party was inconsistent with religious belief. In
practice, that inconsistency has been overlooked in a society that is overwhelmingly Catholic. By 1981 even most party members professed to be believers
(80 percent) and 27 percent called themselves "practicing" Catholics. 40 The party
finally recognized this fact officially when the program of the Ninth Party Congress acknowledged that "religious believers can join the party if they wish to
and be politically active in keeping with its program."41 This stand was reaffirmed, though modified somewhat, in an article on "Believers in the Party" in
Zycie Partii.42 The article asserted that the PUWP was primarily a political party
and not connected with people's world view (a remarkable statement in itself).
Believers could join the party, and the party recognized religion as a private
matter. But the party should strive to change the world view of religious members
in the direction of materialism.
These changes in party policy were criticized both inside and outside the
country. In May 1981 a party "discussion forum" in Katowice adopted a declaration accusing the Kania leadership of having lost its "ideological and political
compass in the struggle for socialism ... under the pressure of alien ideological
influences, supported by right-wing opportunism and liberalism of the bourgeois
type." The statement expressed alarm over increased tendencies within the party
of "Trotskyite-Zionist views, nationalism, agrarianism, clericalism and anti-Sovietism."43 It was not clear how large this group was, or even who was in it, and
the declaration was rejected by official party bodies. But the fact that the statement appeared in an official publication suggested that these conservative views
had at least some support.
Conservative elements in the party received support from a powerful outside
voice in early June 1981, when Soviet party leader Brezhnev addressed a sharply
worded letter to the members of the Polish Central Committee, criticizing the
party leadership for its "constant concessions" and its inability to cope with
40. These figures were derived from the Polacy '80 survey but were not published in Poland.
There were claims in the official press, however, that "two-thirds" of party members were believers,
and a lively debate over the meaning of these claims ensued.
41. The party's program adopted at the Ninth Congress is translated in Roman Stefanowski,
comp., Poland: A Chronology of Events February-July 1981 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1982),
pp. 171-86.
42. Zycie Partii, September 2, 1981.
43. The Katowice forum statement appeared in the official Sztandar Mlodych, May 29-30, 1981;
Radio Free Europe Research, June 1-1. 1981.

41

The Polish Party in Crisis

"counterrevolutionary forces" within Polish society.44 Brezhnev also expressed
concern about the upcoming Polish party congress and the failure of the party
leadership to defend its "experienced cadre" in the preparatory electoral conferences. He asserted that the Soviet Union was the only guarantor of Poland's
sovereignty and reminded the party of its responsibility to the entire socialist
community for the preservation of party rule. The language of the letter was
pointedly similar to that of messages conveyed to the Czechoslovak leadership
in the spring of 1968. The letter must have encouraged conservatives at the
Central Committee plenum a few days later, where there were appeals for the
Politburo to show some "muscle" against the forces of counterrevolution and
Solidarity's "march toward power." In his speech to the plenum, Kania said that
the accusations in Brezhnev's letter were "fully justified" and pledged efforts to
meet the criticisms while maintaining the commitment to socialist renewal. 45
By 1981 there were no major differences in outlook between members of
the PUWP and the rest of society. Most of the views of society reflected in public
opinion polls were similar to those held by members of the party. Table 2, drawn
from the Polacy '81 survey, shows the responses to selected questions by party
members and nonmembers. On some of the major issues of 1981, a majority of
party members agreed with the majority view of nonmembers. It is clear from
these data that party members by no means followed a hard line on these issues.
Eighty percent favored access to radio and television for Solidarity, and almost
half of all party members even favored limiting the role of the party in Polish
society!
A remarkable degree of support by party members for the actions and
programs of Solidarity is evident in other issues, too. Only 21 percent of party
members "decisively opposed" strikes as a form of protest (compared to
13 percent of nonmembers). When asked about participation in acts of protest,
party members more frequently admitted to such acts (21.6 percent) than did
the overall sample (18.4 percent). When asked who was responsible for the govTable 2. Public Opinion of Party Members and Nonmembers on Major Issues in 1981
(percentage)
Issue
Support Guaranteeing Solidarity Access
to Mass Media
Support Limiting the Role of the Party
in the Administration of Power
Support for the Development of Private
Agriculture
Oppose Temporary Increase in the Powers
of the Militia and the Security Forces

Party Members

Nonmembers

79.8

93.5

46.0

62.0

56.2

74.9

53.5

64.5

Source: Polacy '81.
44. "List Komitetu Centralnego KPZR do Komitetu Centralnego PZPR," Nowe Drogi, July
1981, pp. 29-32.
45. Radio Free Europe Research, June 19, 1981.
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ernmental and political CrISIS, party members rarely blamed Solidarity (see
table 3), even though they were also less likely than nonmembers to assign primary responsibility to the government. Furthermore, they overwhelmingly opposed hard-line emergency measures to cope with the crisis at the end of 1981. 46
If there had earlier been a division between party membership and society,
this division largely disappeared by the middle of 1981. The division became one
between society, including most party members, on the one hand and the state
and party leadership on the other. Many party members had joined Solidarity,
and most of them sympathized with its goals. As Alain Touraine's groups concluded from their interviews with Solidarity activists, "ordinary members of the
Party are closer to members of Solidarity than they are to their own leaders."47
The party had joined the process of renewal, but the process was being blocked
at the top.
In the course of 1981 the authorities became increasingly isolated even from
the party membership. In October Kania was replaced as first party secretary
by Premier General Jaruzelski, marking a further diminution of authority for the
party. Even Lech Wal~sa recognized the dangers posed by the weakening of the
party. In an interview with Western reporters just before the imposition of martial
law, he pledged to help the party if it started to discredit itself or collapse:
There are no other realities here. We cannot overthrow the party. We cannot
take the power away from it. We have to preserve it. At the same time,
tame it and let it eat with us, so that it will relish what we create. 48
But it was too late even for Wal~sa to help the party. In the face of accelerating
demands from Solidarity and the accelerating disintegration of the party, Jaruzelski was faced with considerable pressure from hard-liners in the bureaucracy.
There is even some speculation that party bureaucrats attempted to seize power
in March and again in December. According to a Western observer, "the day
before martial law was imposed, Jaruzelski sent the entire apparatus of the Polish
Central Committee into the provinces, trapping them there in order to prevent
a concerted response."49 Jaruzelski claimed that the army had taken control to
Table 3. Opinion on Responsibility for Crisis, by Party Membership (percentage)

Who's Responsible?
Government
Solidarity
Both
Someone else
Difficult to say

Party Members

Nonmembers

25.5
8.7
47.1
4.4
14.6

41.7
2.4
38.9
6.1
10.9

Source: Polacy '81.
46. Polacy '81.
47. Alain Touraine, Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 59.
48. Washington Post, January 10, 1982.
49. Richard Spielman, "Crisis in Poland," Foreign Policy, no. 49 (Winter 1982-83): 32.
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reestablish order and stability and to prevent the total collapse of the party,
which he said was threatened with "physical liquidation." In the months following
the imposition of martial law, the regime made efforts to restore the legitimacy
and reputation of the party. There were extensive purges of party functionaries
at all levels in an apparent effort to "trim both wings" of the party. According
to Jaruzelski, the changes in the party cadres in the two months after martial
law were the most extensive in the history of the party. 50 The party was also
trying to attract back many of those members who had turned in their party
cards after August 1980. But these efforts faced a contrary tendency: tens of
thousands of party members who had stayed in the organization during the Solidarity era turned in their cards in protest of the imposition of martial law.
Membership continued to decline during 1982.
The role of the party in Polish society was another issue that elicited lively
and open debate during 1982. In a discussion of the relationship between the
unions and the party, Trybuna Ludu (the party daily) declared that "it is the
party, or rather political parties, and not the trade union movement, which are
the instruments representing the interests of various classes and nation-wide
interests."51 But by the spring the line had softened somewhat, partially perhaps
because of the regime's lack of success in resuscitating the party. In discussions
about the creation of a "Front of National Understanding" (Front Porozumienia
Narodowego), which was presumably to playa political role, it was stressed that
the front should include people who were not members of the party and even
those who "do not like socialism."52 The front "should enable all social organizations in favor of the political and social system in Poland to participate in
political decision making."53 Despite this rhetoric, the martial law regime was
unsuccessful in transforming the party, the front, or any other official organizations into legitimate representative bodies. By the end of 1982, the regime still
faced a dilemma. Martial law was suspended and formal power returned to the
party and state offices. But the reputation and membership of the party remained
at low levels. By imposing martial law, the army had provided a crutch to the
injured party. But the party was still not able to walk without at least leaning
on the army.
The events of 1980 and 1981 marked a fundamental turning point both for
Poland and the other European Communist states. For the first time in the
postwar history of this region, virtually the entire population united to demand
a qualitative transformation of the system. Most basic was the demand for a
broadening of the base for participation in economic and political decision making and for restrictions on the decision making prerogatives of the party elite.
Support for this demand was widespread even among the party membership,
which also suffered from the centralization of power.
The need for political decentralization in the Communist states and its benefits have long been recognized by Western political scientists. As David Lane
has put it, "the rigid centralised political system devised to implement rapid
50.
51.
52.
53.

Rzeczpospolita, February 25. 1982.
Trybuna Ludu, February 19. 1982.
Zycie Warszawy, April 6, 1982.
Ibid., April 14, 1982.
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industrialisation now becomes redundant when its major task has been completed. It comes into conflict with participant-oriented groupS."54 By 1981 the
imperative for such change was being openly discussed in the Polish press: "In
a word, an escape from the crisis demands changes in the political system,
changes of a qualitative character, such that the system would rely not on methods
of compulsion, but on methods which in effect lead to the desired integration of
society."55 Poland was moving from a "subject political culture" to a "participant" one. Solidarity was the main vehicle for this movement, and the central
party bureaucracy was the main obstacle. While many elective party posts fell
into the hands of reformers during 1981, the central administrative staff-largely
appointed-remained intact. This group was the most threatened by the challenges posed by Solidarity. In retreat, the central party organization relied increasingly on power to maintain its position. In the past the party had been able
to derive some legitimacy from socialist ideology. As the ideological legitimacy
of the party waned, power became the overriding motivation for the bureaucracy,
further exacerbating the tensions between the rulers and the ruled. The elite
increasingly depended on "exclusionary closure" to maintain itself. 56 But in doing
so it became further removed and alienated from society.
Solidarity tried-unsuccessfully-to reform the Polish political system from
the "outside." In order to reform the system, it was necessary to penetrate and
reform the party. There was considerable success in this regard; many party
members joined Solidarity or sympathized with it. The grass roots of the party
initiated significant changes in the rules, structure, membership, and leadership
of the organization. Even the central party leadership tried to adapt to the new
environment by encouraging initiatives, democratization, and decentralization at
the lower levels. But by the end of 1981, the process of renewal was caught on
the horns of a dilemma: the reform was too slow for many members of Solidarity
and too fast for the party bureacracy (and the Soviet leadership). Many members
of Solidarity believed that the union was making too many compromises and that
the only way to move ahead was to continue the pressure on party and governmentY This group constituted only about a third of the membership (and leadership) of Solidarity, but it was a vocal minority. The regime targeted its criticisms
on these "radicals" and identified them as the dominant force within the movement. The appeals of this group for new elections to the Sejm and a referendum
on the party triggered the declaration of martial law.
Many Poles were equally dissatisfied with the pace of change within the
party. "For Poles of the 1970s, the present party would have been the realization
of their most ardent aspirations," but for Poles in late 1981, "the party is still
not democratic enough, not sufficiently humble, too sure of itself, too ready to
usurp power and therefore untrustworthy."58 The party had undergone the most
54. David Lane, The Socialist Industrial State (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1976), p. 8l.
55. Witold Morawski, "0 zr6dlach i naturze kryzysu 1980-1981 w Polsce," Literatura,
September 24, 1981, p. 6.
56. Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979).
57. David S. Mason, "Solidarity and Public Opinion," Paper presented at the annual meeting
of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, D.C., October
1982.
58. Andrzej Szczypiorski, The Polish Ordeal: The View from Within (London: Croom Helm,
1982), p. 146.
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substantial changes in its history, indeed in the history of any Communist party.
Yet the population remained critical of its concentration of power and privilege.
The party bureaucracy saw its position as dire, and this perception was
reinforced by the continuing demands of the more radical Solidarity supporters.
The regime-in contrast to Solidarity-defined renewal as "a process of social
adjustment articulated and implemented 'from above."'59 But this concept conflicted with what was happening both in society and in the party itself, where
most of the changes were generated from below. The party leadership was put
in an unusual and uncomfortable position: for the first time in its history, the
PUWP was not the primary agent for initiating social and economic reforms. At
the same time, the Soviet leadership was issuing dark warnings about the necessity of maintaining the leading role of the party. The imposition of martial law
probably reflected a combination of two interests among the elite: to maintain
itself in power and to avoid the possibility of Soviet intervention.
During 1981 the Polish United Workers' Party had attempted to adapt to
the renewal that was sweeping the country. It became less hierarchical, more
representative, more democratic, and more reformist. It effected significant
changes in its own membership, leadership, organization, and processes. But the
party, like Solidarity, exceeded the boundaries of the possible in the Poland of
1981. The changes that occurred in the party threatened its "leading role," the
sine qua non of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. While most party members
were willing to adapt the party to Solidarity's Poland, much of the entrenched
party and government bureaucracy was not. And those elements found powerful
support both within the country and without. Contrary to the expectations of
most Poles, the democratization of the party was not a sufficient guarantee of
the process of renewal.
59. Jack Bielasiak, "The Evolution of Crises in Poland," in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice Simon, eds., Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).

